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STUDENT NOTES
Judicial Abstention in the Federal Courts-Its
Origin, Purposes and Application
In the early years of the twentieth century, two major constitu-
tional decisions by the Supreme Court threw into sharp focus the
problem of federal equitable interference with state legislative and
administrative action. In Ex pare Young,' the Court established as
a general rule that a suit to enjoin a state official from acting in a
matter alleged to violate the federal constitution is not a suit "against
one of the United States" and therefore is not excluded from federal
judicial power. In Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,2
the Court held that acts of state officials under color of their office
constitute state action within the coverage of the fourteenth amend-
men even though the acts are contrary to state law. These two
' 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2 227 U.S. 278 (1913
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decisions increased the likelihood of interference by federal courts
with the conduct of state governments. The pattern of increased
state regulation of economic and social life has created conflicts and
occasioned the need for self-imposed restraint by the federal courts
in order to preserve a balanced system.'
The most recent in a series of legislative and judicial efforts to
minimize these conflicts has been the Supreme Court's development
of the doctrine of equitable abstention, which requires the federal
courts to defer to the state courts certain classes of cases wherein
exercise of original federal jurisdiction might result in a type of
federal-state conflict thought to be particularly undesirable. Although
several recent decisions by the Supreme Court have dealt with vari-
ous aspects of the doctrine,4 its scope, purpose, and effect remain
unclear.
After the Young decision a series of federal statutes imposed
restraints on the power of the district courts to issue injunctions
against state action. The two most important enactments, the
Johnson Act of 1934,' and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937,6 pro-
hibit the district courts from enjoining the enforcement of state
public utility rate orders and the collection of state taxes if certain
conditions are met, the most important being the availability of a
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. Another reactionary step was
the enactment of the three-judge district court statute,' which re-
quires a three-judge court for hearing suits for interlocutory injunc-
tions against the enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state
statutes. The latest step is the abstention doctrine, which stems from
the rule that granting of equitable relief has always been characterized
as a matter of discretion,8 and it is this rule which the Supreme Court
cites as its authority to develop the doctrine."
In 1941, the abstention doctrine was born in Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co.'0 In this case the Pullman Company and certain
' Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959).
4 E.g., City of Meridan v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639
(1959); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Education, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959);
NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1952).
628 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952).
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2284 (1952).
8 MCCLINTOCy, EQurnr § 23 (2d ed. 1948).
' See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 350-51
(1951); Railroad Commn v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
10 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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railroads operating in Texas had brought an action in a federal dis-
trict court to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Railroad
Commission of Texas prohibiting the operation of any sleeping car
on any line in Texas unless such car were continuously in the charge
of a Pullman conductor. Prior to that time, if a train in Texas car-
ried only one sleeping car, the car had been in the charge of a
Pullman porter. The complainants attacked the order as unauthorized
by the Texas statute defining the Commission's authority and as
violating the equal protection, due process, and commerce clauses
of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the state issue of statutory
authority should be decided first, because resolution of that issue
might end the litigation and thus avoid the necessity of determining
the substantial constitutional issue of discrimination, which touched
a sensitive area of social policy. Turning to the state issue, the Court
found state law to be uncertain, and concluded that any federal de-
termination of the issue would be "tentative" and that an authorita-
tive determination by a state court would be preferable. Since state
law offered easy and ample means for obtaining a decision of the state
issue, the Court reversed the decree of the three-judge court grant-
ing an injunction and remanded the case with directions to retain the
bill pending a determination of proceedings to be brought in the
state courts.
In numerous cases since Pullman, federal courts have abstained
from exercising their jurisdiction in cases involving uncertain state
law where the resolution of a state issue might avoid adjudication
of a federal constitutional issue, without regard to whether the latter
issue touched "a sensitive area of social policy."" Typically in such
cases the plaintiff has urged, in the alternative, state grounds and
federal constitutional grounds for invalidating state action, and res-
olution of the state issue adversely to the state official would avoid
the need for considering federal constitutional issues in any form."2
It seems fairly clear, however, that abstention is also required where
resolution of a state issue could avoid federal constitutional adjudica-
tion only in part or where it could materially change the nature of
" See Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Spector Motor Serv., Inc.
v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316
U.S. 168 (194).
12 See, e.., City of Meridan v. Southern Bell Te. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639
(1959) (validity of state statute under state constitution); Government & Civic
Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (ap-
plicability of state statute to plaintiff).
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the constitutional problem.'3 The Court has, in all but a very few
cases, treated uncertainty in state law as insufficient to justify absten-
tion unless a possibility of avoiding unnecessary constitutional ad-
judication exists.' 4
An underlying principle of the Pullman case is that abstention
will prevent federal courts from misinterpreting state law.'5 In Har-
rison v. NAACP, 6 the Supreme Court seemed to assume that state
courts may be less inhibited than federal courts in construing state
statutes so as to realize "the possibility of limiting interpretation,
characteristic of constitutional adjudication."' 7 This opinion also
seems to emphasize a belief that one of the policies underlying the
Pullman rule is to avoid decision by a federal court that a state
statute is unconstitutional before the state courts have had an oppor-
tunity to interpret it in the light of constitutional objections. 8 If
there is substantially greater likelihood that state courts will construe
state statutes so as to eliminate constitutional infirmities, then either
the more traditional policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional
adjudication or the policy emphasized in the Harrison decision would
be served by abstention. Harrison and other opinions suggest that
the Pullman rule is designed also to avoid unnecessary federal inter-
ference with lawful state action based on a misinterpretation of state
law.'
9
It is clear that the Pullman rule is applicable only where rel-
evant state law is uncertain.2" Speaking on the question of uncer-
tainty, the Supreme Court stated that "federal courts should not
adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to
interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable
'8 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177-78 (1959) (alternative hold-
ing); CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957) (dictum).
14See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944)
(abstention ordered); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (ab-
stention refused); cf. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949) (abstention re-
fused on ground that no constitutional issue could be avoided thereby, but case
possibly distinguishable since no state action involved).
,- Note, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 749, 754 (1959).
16 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
'7 Id. at 177.
'8 Id. at 178; cf. CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
'9 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959); cf. County of Al-
legheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 190 (1959); Martin v. Creasy,
360 U.S. 219, 224 (1959).
20 See, e.g., City of Meridan v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S.
639 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); NAACP v. Bennett,
360 U.S. 471 (1959).
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opportunity to pass on them."'" The decisions thus far have not
formulated, and do not suggest, a more precise standard as to the
degree of uncertainty sufficient to require abstention.
The Pullman rule represents one area in which abstention ap-
plies; the other area in which abstention applies is state administrative
actions. This phase of the doctrine was propounded in two leading
cases, Burlord v. Sun Oil Co." and Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry.2' In Burford, a federal district court had enjoined the
enforcement of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission issued
as part of the state's program to regulate the production of oil and
gas. The Court, in reversing and ordering abstention, said nothing
of avoiding a constitutional decision, and placed only minimal reli-
ance on the uncertainty of the issues of state law. Emphasis was
placed instead on the history of disruption of the state's regulatory
scheme caused by federal equitable interference, the non-legal com-
plexities of a technical nature involved, and the fact that state judicial
review procedures had been concentrated in one state court to avoid
confusion. The Court concluded that intervention of the lower
federal courts in such circumstances would result in conflicts in the
interpretation of state law which would endanger the success of state
policies.2"
In Alabama Pub. Sen,. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 5 the Com-
mission had denied the plaintiff railroad permission to discontinue
the running of two local passenger trains. The railroad brought an
action in the federal district court alleging that the Commission's
order amounted to confiscation of the railroad's property in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. The district court held the Com-
mission's order void and enjoined its enforcement. The Supreme
Court reversed and ordered dismissal of the complaint.
As the case presented no problem concerning the proper con-
struction of a state statute, the Pullman decision was found inap-
posite." Nevertheless, the Court stated that when "adequate state
court review of an administrative order based upon predominantly
local factors" is available to the plaintiff, the intervention of a federal
court is not necessary for the protection of federal rights. In the
absence of state issues, abstention could not effectuate the resolution
2 1 Harrison v. NAACP 360 U.S. 167,176 (1959).
22 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
23 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
24319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
25341 U.S. 341 (1951).26 Id. at 344.
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of uncertainties in state law or the avoidance of federal constitutional
issues, but could only cause the federal constitutional issue to be pre-
sented in the state court. Therefore, the Court must be considered
to have ordered abstention in Alabama solely for the purpose of
avoiding federal-state friction. Subsequent decisions indicate that
the Alabama rule is limited to suits challenging state administrative
action, typically the action of a regulatory commission."
The Alabama rule seems appropriate in cases attacking the
formulation of state policy pursuant to broad legislative standards,
without regard to whether the agency is a regulatory commission
or the official is an administrator.28 Although cases applying the
Alabama rule have usually involved federal constitutional issues, the
purpose of avoiding federal interference with state policy calls for
abstention regardless of whether a federal constitutional issue is or
is not present.
A third area in which the abstention doctrine has been applied
is in civil rights litigation.29 In Harrison v. NAACP,"0 the court
below had enjoined the enforcement of several registration statutes,
which were allegedly designed to inhibit fund raising, lobbying, and
legal operations of the NAACP, finding that no reasonable interpreta-
tion could render such statutes valid under the federal constitution.
The Supreme Court, applying the Pullman rule, reversed and ordered
abstention on the ground that the state courts might construe the
statutes in a way that would avoid federal constitutional adjudication
in whole or in part or that would materially change the nature of
the problem. The Court's opinion did not suggest that it was rely-
ing on any factors that would distinguish Harrison from the usual
case that is brought under the Civil Rights Laws. The three dissenters
in Harrision found in the specific jurisdictional grant of the Civil
Rights Laws a congressional policy of making available a federal
forum for the protection of certain federal rights. However, the
majority gave no indication that the civil rights jurisdiction presents
a different problem than does federal question or diversity jurisdic-
tion. It is possible that Harrison will be limited to cases of the
27 See, e.g., City of Meridan v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel Co., 358 U.S. 639
(1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); City of Chicago v. Atchin-
son, T. & S.F.R.R 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
28 Cf. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935).
29 See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); NAACP v. Bennett,
360 U.S. 471 (1959).
30 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
31 Id. at 179-84.
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Pullman type because the desirability of making available a federal
forum for the vindication of civil rights is paramount.32
The general rule was well-stated in Meredith v. Winter Haven33
that uncertainty in state law is not in itself sufficient to justify ab-
stention. However, the recent case of Louisiana Power and Light Co.
v. Thibodaux stands out as being contra to the well-established
rule.34 On the same day that the Thibodaux decision was handed
down, the Court reached an opposite result in an almost identical
case.3 In Thibodaux, the question involved the city's authority to
condemn certain land, buildings, and equipment of the power com-
pany. The Supreme Court stated that the federal district judge's
decision to abstain was justified by the special and peculiar nature
of an eminent domain proceeding and by the quandry in which he
had been placed by an apparently irreconcilable conflict between the
language of the state statute and an opinion of the state attorney
general. There were no federal constitutional issues raised in the
case. The Court distinguished this case from Meredith on the ground
that Thibodaux involved discretion to stay disposition of a case over
which he retained jurisdiction until controlling guidance could be
obtained from the state court, whereas Meredith dealt with whether
the district judge should be compelled to surrender jurisdiction over
an entire case.
It is unclear whether uncertainty in state law would be sufficient
to justify abstention in a case not involving the procedural features
noted by the Court in distinguishing Thibodaux from Meredith, espe-
cially since none of the features presents a convincing ground for
distinction. To distinguish Meredith on the ground that it dealt only
with whether a district judge was under compulsion to abstain dis-
regards both the language and rationale of Meredith." Conceivably,
the district courts might be permitted to abstain merely because of
the presence of uncertain state law, at least in suits challenging state
action. The dissenters in Thibodaux characterized the majority opin-
ion as an opening wedge for abstention in even the routine diversity
negligence action when an issue of state law is involved.3" To extend
the case in this way, however, would be to disregard the Court's
careful attempts to limit Thibodaux. At most, Thibodaux should be
3 2 Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749, 768-69 (1959).
33 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
34 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
35 County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
36 320 U.S. 228,234 (1943).
37 360 U.S. 25, 44 (1959).
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limited to its peculiar facts and circumstances. In the three years
since Thibodaux, no cases have cited it as authority for utilizing
abstention in solely uncertain state law situations.
An even more far-reaching ramification has evolved from
Thibodaux in that the Court, for the first time, applied the absten-
tion doctrine to an action at law, rather than to a suit seeking equit-
able relief. It would be far-fetched to interpret the Court as saying
that eminent domain proceedings are included within a broad def-
inition of suits in equity. The apparent implication of Thibodaux
is that abstention is appropriate in an action at law whenever the
action presents the same hazards of "serious disruption by federal
courts of state government or needless friction between state and
federal authorities" present in suits in which abstention had previous-
ly been ordered.38
Once the Court has ordered abstention, it generally prescribes
the techniques of disposition to be used upon remand of the case.
The techniques thus prescribed fall into three general categories:
(1) dismissal of the complaint, (2) retention of jurisdiction over
the case by the district court while a suit embracing all issues is
brought in the state courts, and (3) excission of a single issue of
uncertain state law from the suit in the federal court to be submitted
to the state courts for determination in a proceeding limited to that
issue while the federal suit is held in abeyance. The technique gen-
erally is used in cases where the Pullman rule is applied, which con-
stitute the bulk of the cases in which abstention is ordered. 9
The Court has never laid down any principles determining
when retention, as opposed to dismissal, is appropriate, and the
facts of the decided cases suggest no such principles. The obvious
purpose of retention is to make a federal forum available in the
event there is unreasonable delay in obtaining a state adjudication.
However, as a practical matter, the suit would never again reach the
federal district court since most state courts will adjudicate federal
constitutional issues, and any appeal therefrom would be directly
to the Supreme Court of the United States. Therefore, retention is
no better in reality than dismissal. Excission has been used only
sparingly. In fact, in remanding with instructions to use excission,
the Court in Thibodaux used this as a basis for distinguishing it
3 8 1d. at 28.
39 See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959)- CIO v. Windsor,
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from Meredith. Following this reasoning, excission may be limited
to cases of the Thibodaux variety.
A recent case, Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd.," has suggested that
yet another approach to the same problem, another type of ab-
stention, may be for the federal courts of appeals to certify pertinent
questions of state law to the state supreme courts.
In the Clay case, suit was brought in the federal district court
in Florida to recover on an insurance policy issued to the plaintiff
while in Illinois. A provision in this policy, probably valid under
Illinois law but clearly not so under the laws of Florida, would have
prohibited recovery. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff,
on the theory that Florida law invalidated the provision in question.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The questions of
Florida law on which the district court had predicated its disposition
of the case was discussed but were pretermitted, the court simply
holding that to apply the Florida statute to this Illinois contract
would do violence to the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court, on certiorari, stated that the court of
appeals had erred in reaching the constitutional question, since the
state law question involved in the case may have proven dispositive.
In ordering abstention, the Court relied upon Meredith4 and
Mashuda.42 The case was remanded to the court of appeals with
the suggestion that a Florida statute providing for certification of
unsettled questions of state law from the federal courts of appeals
to the Florida Supreme Court be utilized.
From the standpoint of logic, it would seem that the appropriate-
ness of exercising either type of abstention, the usual abstention, as
announced in Pullman and Alabama, or this new inter-sovereign
certification, would be determinable at the outset of the federal liti-
gation. 3 It is believed that there are cogent reasons why certifica-
tion by trial courts would prove undesirable. First, such certification
would not be in accord with the general scheme of federal-state
judicial relations. The intendment of the system is that the district
courts perform all facets of the task of litigation in cases properly in
the federal system. If certification were to be allowed from federal
district courts to the highest court of the state, it would seem that
the increase in docket load in the state courts might well prove pro-
40 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
41 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
42 County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
43 Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 777, 780 (1961).
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hibitive. Second, the problem is presented of which tribunal is to
find the facts necessary to furnish a background for determination
of the certified question. If certification is requested at the begin-
ning of the case, then either the questions would have to be answered
by the state court in the absence of any factual setting, which would
result in an abstract or hypothetical answer, or the state court would
be required to make findings of fact, which would do violence to
the theory of certification as a speedy and inexpensive method of
determining the answer to isolated questions of law. Neither of the
above objections is presented by the usual type of abstention, where
the parties repair initially to the lower state courts which make essen-
tial findings of fact.
If inter-sovereign certification is to be exercised only by the
courts of appeals, some of the objections disappear. Ordinarily, a
court of appeals will have at its disposal sufficient findings of facts.
However, there is a serious chance that the supreme court of a
state will be certified a question of law which, had the entire case
come before that court, it would have been able to avoid answering.
Another problem is how much factual background must be pre-
sented. On the other hand, if a federal court abstains by retention
or dismissal, the party seeking relief suffers by the consequent
delay, and both parties suffer the extra expense of initiating inde-
pendent proceedings in state courts.44 The certification procedure
should reduce both burdens.4"
Through the certification technique, a state supreme court will
not acquire jurisdiction ultimately to decide a controversy before
the federal courts, but renders only an advisory opinion to the fed-
eral judiciary.46 Therefore, the federal courts have placed the state
courts in the role of an advisory committee.
Although the methods of applying the abstention doctrine are
uncertain at the present time, the doctrine itself is now deeply en-
twined in our jurisprudence. The Supreme Court approves of its
utilization, and by the Thibodaux case, appears to have extended
its application to actions at law as well as to suits in equity. The
doctrine does not involve the adjudication of federal jurisdiction, but
only the postponement of its exercise. It serves the policy of comity
inherent in its application, and spares the federal courts of unneces-
44 See, e.g., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
45 Comment, 36 TuL. L. REv. 571, 573 (1962).46 Note, 16 U. Mwxm L. REv. 413, 432 (1962).
[Vol. 65
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol65/iss3/4
STUDENT NOTES
sary constitutional adjudication.47 Case law had produced guide lines
which aid the practitioner and courts in determining when and under
what circumstances the doctrine is applicable and have developed it
into a useful tool for the disposition of cases involving both constitu-
tional and state law questions. However, the doctrine is certainly
amenable to refinement, and as this is accomplished, it will assume
a purposeful and lofty position in American jurisprudence.
David Mayer Katz
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